Abstract: In this paper paraconsistent first-order logic LP # ω with infinite hierarchy levels of contradiction is proposed. Corresponding paraconsistent set theory KSth # ω is discussed.
The real history of non-Aristotelian logic begins on May 18,1910 when N.A. Vasiliev presented to the Kazan University faculty a lecture "On Partial Judgements, the Triangle of Opposition, the Law of Excluded Fourth" [Vasiliev 1910 ] to satisfy the requirements for obtaining the title of privat-dozent. In this lecture Vasiliev expounded for the first time the key principles of non-Aristotelian, imaginary, logic. In this work he likewise constructed his "imaginary" logic free of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle in the informal, so-tospeak Aristotelian, manner (although imaginary logic is in essense non-Aristotelian).Thus the birthday of new logic was exactly fixed in the annals of history. Vasiliev's reform of logic was radical, and he did his best to determine whether it was possible for the new logic with new laws and new subject to imply a new logical Universe. Vasiliev began the modern non-classical revolution in logic, but he certainly did not complete it. The founder of paraconsistent logic, N.A. Vasiliev, stated as a characteristic feature of his logic, three kinds of sentence, i.e. "S is A", "S is not A", "S is and is not A". Thus Vasiliev logic rejected the law of non-contradiction: ¬ (A ∧ ¬A) and the law of excluded middle: A ∨ ¬A.However Vasiliev's logic preserve the law of excluded fourth: I. Logical postulates:
II.Rules of a conclusion:
Unrestricted Modus Ponens rule MP ur :
Unrestricted Modus Tollens rule: P → Q,˜Q ⊢ ur˜P .
III.Quantification
Corresponding to the propositional paraconsistent relevant logic LP
we construct the corresponding paraconsistent relevant first-order predicate calculi. These new calculi will be denoted by LP 
, where we used the following definitions: α ,we can construct the following predicate calculi with equality. This is done by adding to their languages the binary predicates symbol of strong equality (· = ·) or (· = s ·) and weak equality(· = w ·) with suitable modifications in the concept of formula, and by adding the following postulates:
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(ii) α (ω) stands for ∀n α (n) . (iii) the (finite) n-order of the level of consistency:
. (iii) the (finite) n-order of the level of inconsistency: I. Logical postulates:
n,i iff P n,i ∈ V n ,i = 1, 2, ...; n = 1, 2, ...
Unrestricted Modus Ponens rule MP ur : A, A → B ⊢ ur B.
Corresponding to the propositional paraconsistent relevant logic LP # ω V we construct the corresponding paraconsistent relevant first-order predicate calculi. These new calculi will be denoted by LP
The postulates of LP
plus the following:
From the calculi LP
# ω V ,we can construct the following predicate calculi with equality. This is done by adding to their languages the binary predicates symbol of strong equality (· = ·) or (· = s ·) and weak equality(· = w ·) with suitable modifications in the concept of formula, and by adding the following postulates:
[n] , n = 0, 1, 2, ...
, n = 0, 1, 2, ...
IV. Paraconsistent set theory KSth
# ω Cantor's "naive" set theory KSth was based mainly on two fundamental principles: the postulate of extensionality (if the sets x and y have the same elements, then they are equal), and the postulate of comprehension or separation (every property determines a set, composed of the objects that have this property). The latter postulate, in the standard (first-order) language of set theory, becomes the following formula (or schema of formulas): ∃y∀x(x ∈ y ↔ F (x, y)).
(4.1) Now, it is enough to replaces the formula F (x) in (4.1) by x / ∈ x to derive Russell's paradox. That is, the principle of comprehension (4.1) entails an inconsistency. Thus, if one adds (4.1) to classical first-order logic, conceived as the logic of a set-theoretic language, a trivial theory is obtained. (α ∧ ¬α). Definition 4.2.(i) x ∈ (n) y is to stands for (x ∈ y) (n) and is to mean "x is a strong consistent member of y of the n-order of the n-level of s-consistency ".
(ii) x ∈ [n] y is to stands for (x ∈ y) [n] and is to mean "x is a strong inconsistent member of y of the n-order of the n-level of s-inconsistency ".
The standard non-classical response to these paradoxes is to find fault with the logical and deduction principles involved in the deduction. Most standard approaches to the paradoxes take them to be important lessons in the behaviour of a Boolean negation.
However if you wish to define negation non-classically, there are many options available.You can define negation inferentially, taking A to mean that if A,then something absurd follows,or it can be defined by way of the equivalence between the truth of˜A and the falsity of A, and allowing truth and falsity to have rather more independence from one another than is usually taken to be the case: say, allowing statements to be neither true nor false, or both true and false. The former account takes truth as primary, and defines negation in terms of a rejected proposition and implication.
For example, you can to define negation˜A non-classically: A A → ∀x∀y [(x ∈ y) ∧ (x = s y)] . (1) ⊢ ur ℜ˜∈ ℜ˜↔˜(ℜ˜∈ ℜ˜) .
By unrestricted modus pones MP ur , we obtain: (2) ⊢ ur ℜ˜∈ ℜ˜∧˜(ℜ˜∈ ℜ˜) .
Thus by unrestricted modus tollens rule we obtain the contradiction 
